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INTRODUCTION
For over half a century, human rights have remained an ideal yet
unexcelled in the hope of providing a means to peace and an end to
suffering in our world. Nevertheless, wars abound and human suffering
endures-far beyond what we would care to imagine. World leaders speak
on international respect for human rights; world leaders endorse their
unspeakable violation. The reality of human rights thus remains entirely
problematic. Equally problematic, moreover, is the idea of human rights. At
the very heart of the conceptual problem of human rights is the question of
whetherthey are in fact universal. Dr. Surya P. Subedi, in his article entitled
Are the Principles of Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis of the
Claim of the "Asian" Concept of Human Rights from the Perspectives of
Hinduism, has proposed for our consideration an argument that human
rights are universal.' The staff of the California Western International Law
Journal has graciously invited me to provide a response.
Part I of this discussion will articulate what I take to be the conceptual
structure of Subedi's argument on the universality of human rights
principles and how he conceives the Hindu concept of dharma to
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1. Surya P. Subedi, Are the Principles of Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis
of the Claim of the "Asian" Concept of Human Rights From the Perspectives of Hinduism,
30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 45 (1999).
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substantiate this claim. Part II will delineate my own understanding of the
conceptual grammar of Western rights language.' Part III will compare this
conceptuality with that of Indian rights vis-A-vis their Hindu religious
heritage.3 Part IV will articulate the Judeo-Christian religious heritage of
Western rights." Finally, in conclusion, this discussion will address the
fundamental theological differences between Western and Hindu rights
language.
I. DHARMA AND UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
In his reflection upon human rights, Subedi is anxious to defend their
universality against competing claims of cultural relativism. Subedi
observes that two camps advance the claim of cultural relativism as it
relates to human rights. On the one hand, Asian States claim cultural
relativism to protect their native cultures from intrusion by the Western
values ostensibly endemic to the jurisprudence of human rights.? Subedi
contends that political motives typically drive these claims, which are used
to justify oppressive governmental practices.' On the other hand, Western
scholars endorse cultural relativism by asserting human rights as a
distinctively Western concept.! Subedi contends that ethnocentric
shortsightedness drives this assertion, which ignores the human rights tenets
of other traditions.8 Subedi argues on the contrary that the principles of
2. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, "Human Rights": Would You Recognize One if You
Saw One? A Philosophical Hearing of International Rights Talk, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 265
(1997).
3. See Matthew A. Ritter, Universal Rights Talk/Plurality of Voices: A Philosophical
and Theological Hearing of International Rights Ta!k, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELIGION
417, 441-44 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 2d ed. 1999).
4. See id. at 450-52.
5. See Subedi, supra note 1, at 46-47.
6. See id. Explaining that certain Asian States resist implementation of universal human
rights principles vis-i-vis
the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds" [quoting Bangkok Declaration of Human
Rights].... [which] has been used quite frequently since the early 1960s by
various Asian political leaders to justify, inter alia, either a one-party system of
government or a party-less one.
Id. at 47. Thus endorsing the position that universal human rights are Western values
unsuitable for Asian States.
7. See id. at 49.
8. See id. Explaining that although
the Western world, perhaps more than any other civilization, has made a
significant contribution to the development of modern international human rights
standards ... that is not to say that other civilizations had no practice of human
rights or no knowledge of the concept itself, [which] misunderstanding on the part
of such Western writers is partly due to their narrow Euro-centric perception of
international law.
2
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human rights are universal, may be found in all great civilizations and
religions of the world, and therefore apply equally to all persons, regardless
of State citizenship.9 Subedi seeks to illustrate this through a conceptual
analysis of the Hindu notion of dharma.0
As Subedi observes, dharma derives from the Sanskrit root dhr (to
uphold or maintain), and articulates the law that regulates Hindu life,
expressing "what must be done to maintain and support the individual, the
family, social class, and the whole society."" Dharma thus establishes the
proper mode of human existence, and provides the foundation for the Hindu
understanding of law and justice. 2 For Subedi, dharma exhibits human
rights principles in three significant ways.
First, Subedi argues that dharma is an essentially secular principle that
is not a specific function of either divine or autocratic dictate. Dharma
functions in Hindu thought not only to structure social reality, but reality
itself, thus expressing the law of the cosmos in a metaphysical sense.' 3
Hindu gods and kings are therefore equally subject to dharma.4 Second,
dharma is consequently a universal concept. It establishes order among all
aspects of reality-cosmic, divine, human, animal, vegetable.'" Third,
dharma dictates accordingly a ubiquitous harmony among all human beings,
regardless of familial, communal, national, or religious affiliation.'6 Subedi
thus contends that by virtue of its concept of dharma, Hindu thought
Id.
9. See id. at 48.
10. 'The very concept of dharma in Hinduism contains many tenets of modem
principles of human rights." Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 52 (quoting JOHN M. KOLLER, THE INDIAN WAY 62 (1982)).
12. "Dharma.... used in a legal sense.... refers to the laws and traditions governing
society, informing every citizen of the rules governing social life." Id. (quoting JOHN M.
KOLLER, THE INDIAN WAY 62 (1982)); see also K.L. Seshagiri Rao, Practitioners of Hindu
Law: Ancient and Modem, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1185, 1186 (1998) ("The purpose of
dharma is to maintain and conserve established social order as well as the general welfare of
humankind.").
13. See Subedi, supra note 1, at 53-54 ("The concept of dharma in its original sense
means the maintenance of peace and security through the law and order within the larger
cosmic order.").
14.
Society ... is an aspect of cosmic patterns [and therefore its rulers are] ... not free
to establish regulations which serve [society's] ... own purposes, but [are]
obliged to order its life in a way which brings order to the larger cosmic
framework as well. Society is not the slave of divine purpose, but it is part of [a]
larger order ....
Id. (quoting PAUL YOUNGER, INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 35-36 (1972)).
15. See id.
16. "Since time immemorial Hindu philosophy has embraced the idea of harmony and
fraternity among all human beings .. " Id. at 54. Subedi observes that this dharmic
harmony extends to all aspects of social reality: "Dharma is the law of righteousness that
regulates relations between the individual, the family, the community, and the State." Id. at
53.
3
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embraces the essential human rights principles of secularism, universalism,
and peace. 7
Taking his point of departure from dharma as an organizational
principle of social order, Subedi further contends that by virtue of any
particular society being organized as a society, it similarly exemplifies these
principles of human rights.'8 Subedi, therefore, concludes that human rights
are universal: "They are universal because every human being living in
every corner of the world needs the protection of such rights, and every
civilized society in every orderly and civilized country has recognized them
as such since time immemorial."' 9 The individualism typical of the West,
Subedi avers, is thus not intrinsic to human rights, but to the Western
version of human rights." "Not every form of extreme individualism and
excessive liberalism is part and parcel of universal human rights."'" Neither
Asian autocrats nor Western scholars are consequently justified in
construing human rights as unique to the West.22 "[S]o far as the respect for
fundamental principles of human rights is concerned, it is as much deeply
rooted in Asian culture as it is in Western culture."23
17.
Thus, secularism in the conduct of the domestic affairs of the State, universalism
in human approaches to the outside world, and adherence to the principle of
peaceful co-existence when dealing with foreign powers of different faiths and
beliefs, are some of the key elements deeply rooted in ancient Hindu thinking.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
18.
[O]ther parts of the world had their own way of ensuring an orderly and civilized
society in the absence of which there could be no State or society.... Every
human being had some measure of protection under the law of the State of their
domicile. The modem concept of human rights is an expansion, consolidation,
codification, and crystallization of that State practice. Human rights were not
invented overnight out of nowhere.
Id. at 58.
19. Id. at 58.
20. See id. at 66:
The mistake many people make is to regard the vices of the Western societies [i.e.,
"rapid decay in morality and an unprecedented level of violent crime, drug-related
problems, vagrancy, vandalism ...... due to an "extreme form of
individualism... and the "I want-it-all" consumer culture . I... d. at 65] as part
of the human rights package, and attribute the failures of Western governments
and societies to the international human rights regime.
Id. at 65-66.
21. Id. at 67.
22. See id. at 69 ("To maintain that the concept of human rights is a Western concept, or
that they were created by the adoption of the UDHR [United Nation's 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights],. . . is to ignore the history and contributions of other
civilizations.").
23. Id. at 66-67.
4
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II. GRAMMAR OF WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE
Before reflecting on Subedi's universalist contention regarding the
"deep roots" of human rights principles, it behooves us to examine their
history and conceptuality. The modem history of international human rights
began in San Francisco at the 1945 Charter Convention of the United
Nations,"4 "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
''25worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women ....
Since its Charter, the United Nations has enacted numerous declarations and
covenants regarding human rights. 6 Beyond North America and Western
Europe, human rights are constitutionally guaranteed throughout post
colonial Africa" and Latin America,28 the Middle East,29 and the Far East,
including Japan," China,3 and India.' More than thirty new democratic
governments proclaiming the fundamentality of human rights have
established themselves since 1973." Some 125 States have adopted' the
United Nations multilateral treaty guaranteeing civil and political rights."
This worldwide agreement on human rights principles accords with
Subedi's universalist contentions, and leads some human rights scholars to
infer along with Subedi that the roots of human rights principles run deep
24. See Lewis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982).
25. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
26. See Sohn, supra note 24, at 11-17. The U.N. Charter initially asserted the
international recognition of human rights. These rights were enumerated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and elaborated in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well as in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The United Nations has since adopted some 50 additional declarations and
conventions concerning human rights. See id. at 11. For the text of these documents, see
UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev. 1 (1978).
27. See Keebet von Benda-Beckman, Western Law and Legal Perceptions in the Third
World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 225, 232 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 1990).
28. See Francisco Miro Quesada, Human Rights in Latin America, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 303, 305 (Paul Ricoeur ed., 1986).
29. See Mohammed Allal Sinaceur, Islamic Tradition and Human Rights, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 193, 208.
30. See Ryosake Inagaki, Some Aspects of Human Rights in Japan, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 179, 179.
31. See Roger T. Ames, Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 199, 209 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 1988).
32. See John B. Carman, Duties and Rights in Hindu Society, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 31, at 113, 117.
33. See John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1996).
34. See Donna E. Artz, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14
WIS. INT'L L.J. 349, 358 (1996).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
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into all the various religious/cultural traditions of the world.36
Despite this translation of the universal declaration of human rights into
a plethora of international treaties and national constitutions that bind nearly
every nation on the planet, the implementation of universal respect for
human rights remains largely confined to the realm of discourse.37
Moreover, notwithstanding ostensible international agreement on human
rights principles, no unanimity exists on their universality vis-A-vis the
world's plurality of religion and culture,38 their possible contingency upon
gender,39 or their peculiarity to Western culture. ' Whether unanimity can
36. See Sampong Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 305, 306 (1987) ("[W]e can find the notion of
human rights in all societies and at all times, in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa, in
antique as well as in modem Chinese philosophy, in Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam."); cf MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 81(1991):
[Tihe great religious traditions, Indic as well as Semitic, tend to converge with one
another in affirming that an essential part of what it means to be fully human, an
essential requirement of the meaningful life for everyone, is to accept some
responsibility for the basic well-being of the Other (the outsider, the stranger, the
alien).
Id.
37. See Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human
Rights Law, and the Salmon Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375, 383 (1996)
("[T]he universality of human rights appears to be the rhetoric of a political project, rather
than the expression of an established fact."); see also Leroy S. Rouner, Introduction, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 31, at 1, 1:
Confronted by holocaust after holocaust, and war on war, where the burning of
children is commonplace, and the suffering of all unspeakable, we know beyond
any possible doubt that these things are wrong. We have a right to be free of such
suffering. Two separate affirmations are involved in this conviction, however. One
is that the individual human being has inherent dignity and worth. The other is
that human rights is the most significant symbol of that worth. The first conviction
remains strong in moral philosophy, East and West. The second is now being re-
examined in the West, either directly or indirectly.
Id.
38. See generally Ritter, supra note 3, at 417 (addressing the Western metaphysics of
human rights and then comparatively analyzing the conceptual grammar of rights talk within
the African Banjul Charter, Islamic Sharia, Hindu Dharma, Confucian Li, Buddhist Dhamma,
and Judeo-Christian Grace); Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and
Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1340 (1993):
Related to universality's problem of indeterminacy is its apparent inability to
escape charges of ethnocentrism. That is, when assessing a right alleged to be a
universal human right, it is difficult to determine whether the claim is truly
universal, namely, part of what it means to be human, or simply is a set of beliefs
specific to a particular culture disguised by the rhetoric of universality.
Id.
39. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, Language, Law, and Male Privilege: The Penile
Code, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (1998) (examining whether the grammar of human rights is a
masculine construction).
40. See Jan Berting, Societal Change, Human Rights and the Welfare State in Europe, in
6
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exist depends upon the conceptual grammar of human rights language.
In the West, the universality of human rights is entirely a function of
their possession by individuals." They are held by any one individual to the
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD, supra note 27, at 189, 194 ("The concept of human
rights is the product of both Enlightenment and the rise of a new social order based on
industrial production."); Sucharitkul, supra note 36 ("Human rights, as commonly known
and widely understood in the modem world, are essentially a European concept, the
consequence of prevailing economic, social, and political conditions in Europe. They have
been drafted by diplomats and legal experts educated according to the European legal
traditions and ideology."). This criticism was in fact articulated during the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On behalf of the American Anthropological
Association, a "Statement on Human Rights" appeared in the American Anthropologist and
was submitted as well to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, warning that the
Declaration would be "a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent
in the countries of Western Europe and America," that such "standards and values are relative
to the culture from which they derive," and that "what is held to be a human right in one
society may be regarded as anti-social by another people." Am. Anthropological Ass'n,
Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947), quoted in Tracy E.
Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 92
(1996), and in ALLISON DUNDES RENTLEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (1990). This
criticism has led to the further contention that Western rights talk is perhaps inappropriate in
non-Western contexts. This stands in direct conflict, of course, with the categorical
presumption that "international human rights standards can be legitimately applied to non-
Western societies." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3
(1989). In essence, international jurisprudence has leveled upon Western rights talk the
critical question of whether human rights are indeed a "universal invariant," or are rather
something peculiar to the West, and thus inappropriate to cultures other than Western. See
Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? 120 DIOGENES 75,
76(1982).
41. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi, 139 (Harv. Univ. Press 1978);
see also Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collective Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD, supra note 27, at 39, 43 ("[O]nly individuals have human
rights."). This contention has generated an extensive debate among human rights advocates as
to whether human rights can inhere in collectivities. Donnelly contends that because human
rights are held only by individuals (by virtue of being human), human collectivities cannot
possess human rights other than through the rights held individually by their members. See
id. Donnelly is primarily concerned to preserve the essential function of human rights as a
protection of individuals against oppression by the collective, whether political, religious,
ethnic, or social. Thus, collectivities are imprudently construed as having any rights that
could possibly be used to obviate the rights of their individual members. See id. at 48. "Every
day we see individuals crushed by society. Rarely if ever do we see society torn apart by the
exercise of individual human rights; social disorder and decay are instead usually associated
with the violation of individual human rights by the state or some other organized segment of
society." id. at 49. The alternative view argues that collectivities are not adequately
understood as derivative from the reality of their individual members, that social reality is
more than merely epiphenomenal. See Koo VanderWal, Collective Human Rights: A Western
View, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD, supra note 27, at 83, 92. VanderWal
argues the social dimension of individuals' human existence is compatible with the notion of
collective human rights. "The collective human rights then pertain to that particular form of
human subjectivity that is expressed in the common action of an inclusive community." Id. at
96. Unless the grammar of rights talk is structured upon a more expansive metaphysic of the
person than that inherent in the Western notion of the individual as autonomous and
abstracted from any and all social differentia, however, human rights are simply not
conceptually consistent with being held by anything other than individuals. Several such lines
of conceptual resistance to individualism-all traceable in one way or another to a more
7
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extent that they are held by all individuals. "Human rights are, by definition,
the rights, in the strict and strong sense of entitlements, that one has simply
because one is a human being."' Intrinsic to the notion of human rights is
the idea that they are equally held by all human beings."3 Western rights
language thus presumes equality for all who possess them."
The egalitarian possession of human rights is a function, moreover, of
the dignity or worth equally inherent in each individual human being. ' Talk
of human rights speaks essentially about the intrinsic value of each human
Aristotelean understanding of the socially organic character of human existence-have
indeed been drawn through modem Western thought. In the arena of political philosophy,
Marx rejected any strict dualism between the individual and society. See Berting, supra note
40. Kant conceived the State as having a kind of moral personhood. See VanderWal, supra,
at 91. Rousseau considered his notion of the "common will," communally constituted
through social contract, to be a distinct form of human social reality. See id. In a similar vein,
the sociologist Durkheim advanced a notion of collective conscience in explicit contrast to
Hobbesean and Lockean ideas of social contract based upon individual self-interest as the
governing factor for social reality. See Berting, supra note 40, at 195. An expansion of the
Western metaphysic of the person may therefore be a viable philosophical enterprise, but
unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this discussion.
42. Donnelly, supra note 41, at 39.
43. Although rights talk has been spoken by a variety of quite different voices in the
history of their jurisprudence, these voices are univocal in the presumption that such human
rights are held by each individual to the extent that they are held equally by all individuals.
Numerous analysts have suggested a variety of specific formulations for the
philosophical foundations of human rights. Such foundations include the
fulfillment of human potential, social justice, promotion of essential human needs,
equal respect and concern for all by governments, common historical social
interest or "praxis," just provision of needs, and traditional Western notions of
natural rights. Although differing in detail and approach, nearly all of these
theories contend that human rights are ultimately based upon essential human
needs and interests possessed by all people equally as prerequisites to human
dignity.
Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for
Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345, 359 (1991).
44. See DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 272 ("Government must not only treat people with
concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 302 (1971) ("Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties for all."); ALISTAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 66 (1981) ("By 'rights' [are meant] those rights which are
alleged to belong to human beings as such and... to attach equally to all individuals .... ).
45. See PATRICIA WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 3 (1985), quoted in
Henry Rosemont, Jr., Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 31, at 167, 170 ("I shall assume that all human
beings... have inherent value. Because human beings have inherent value they have certain
rights. These rights are moral rights .... "); see also Sinaceur, supra note 29, at 195:
[Alt the source of public liberties we find an ethical value, an ethical vision, which
confers on human rights a status independent both of law in the traditional sense
and of ideologies, a value that cannot be considered from the standpoint of what is
valid, what is comparable, relative or evaluable, what is effective or practicable.
This value or vision is the worth of the human "individual."
8
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being-an intrinsic value equally common to each and every individual
simply by virtue of being human. Human rights language is talk that
demands universal egalitarian respect for the dignity intrinsic to all human
individuals.
The universality of human rights language is thus coincident with the
internationalization of the individual. "[R]ights are political trumps held by
individuals."" The universalization of rights language evolved from the idea
that individual human beings exist not for the benefit of the State, but rather
that the State exists for the benefit of the individual.47 Human rights
proclaim the intrinsic worth of the individual against the legislative
authority of the State, inverting the classical logic of relationship between
the State and its citizenry."8 The governing principle of human rights is the
equality of all individuals by virtue of their intrinsic dignity as human.
Human rights language therefore prevents any existential
differentiation in the intrinsic worth of an individual on the basis of any
socially defining characteristic, whether political, religious, ethnic,
economic, sexual, etc. Such social differentiations are extrinsic to the
essential nature of human beings. In essence, all human beings are equal by
virtue of nothing-i.e., not by virtue of any some-thing in terms of which
individuals may be socially differentiated. 9 Human rights are therefore
possessed by individuals-by every individual-simply by virtue of being
human, and not by virtue of any extraneous social differentia."
Consequently, human rights are possessed universally by all individuals."
All other aspects of human rights sprout from this fundamental root: their
universal and egalitarian possession by all persons on the basis of the
inherent dignity of every individual human being simply by virtue of being
human, and not by virtue of any other defining social characteristic
46. DWORKIN, supra note 41, at xi.
47. See J. Herman Burgers, The Function of Human Rights as Individual and Collective
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD, supra note 27, at 63, 64.
48. See id.
49. Much ink has been spilled over the course of the past two centuries, particularly in
American jurisprudence, on trying rationally to determine how-in terms of what aspect of
humanity-humans are equal. This effort, however, has been for naught, because it
misunderstands the conceptual grammar of the Western notion of human equality. If there
were anything in terms of which all humans were equal, then that very thing would become a
means to differentiate one individual from another, providing a measure whereby one person
may become "more equal" than another, hence not equal. In the West, humans are simply not
equal by virtue of any socially defining characteristic, whether that be construed as having
some religious, racial, ethnic, gender, or political identity, possessing land, riches, beauty, or
intelligence. Humans are equal in terms of nothing. The Western notion of equality demands
this by conceptual necessity-but not by mere philosophical fiat. Rather, this Western notion
of equality devolved from a distinctive religious heritage. See discussion infra Part IV.
50. See Jean-Bernard Marie, Relations Between Peoples' Rights and Human Rights:
Semantic and Methodological Distinctions, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 195, 198 (1986) ("[T]he central
subject of human rights as embodied in the basic international texts is still quite definitely the
irreducible human person.").
51. See DONNELLY, supra note 40, at 1.
9
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whatsoever.
Western rights language thus articulates a programmatically secular
appreciation for the essential humanity universally intrinsic to all human
beings-an essential humanity constitutive of the sameness of all humans,
and providing the programmatic basis for the claim of equality between
them, regardless of social differentia, especially religious. 2 This essential
humanity engenders an equally secular understanding of the human being:
the abstract autonomous individual: rational, independent, self-sufficient,
unencumbered, and unconnected to others except by choice. 3 Western rights
ultimately protect and promote abstract autonomous individuality.
III. INDIC RIGHTS V. WESTERN RIGHTS
Despite Subedi's claim that the principles of human rights run deep into
the religious heritage of India, the sacred texts of Hinduism articulate no
such notion of human rights. Classical Sanskrit had no word for a human
"right."''1 The closest semantic correlate, adhikara-the word used to mean
"right" in contemporary India-permits a "just claim" by virtue of having
either performed some act (dharma) of value or attained some thing of
value.55 Such acts or things of value accord status, and upon the basis of
such status one may justly claim one's appropriate due.56 Contrary, then, to
52. See Ritter, supra note 2, at 273 ("Modern jurisprudence [of human rights] was
initiated upon a programmatically non-religious basis. Rights talk would base itself not upon
the extrinsically revealed truth of the divine, but upon the intrinsically known truth of the
human.").
53. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 48 (1991); see also Ritter, supra note 3, at
428 (citations omitted):
The essential being of human being is thus constituted as the pre-communal
autonomy of the abstract individual. How this essential being is communally
realized is a function of preserving its defining character of autonomy. The
abstract individual becomes itself precisely by virtue of being itself, namely
autonomous. The central and controlling issue for the abstract autonomous
individual thus becomes: how to protect and promote one's autonomy. For
modernity, autonomy is preserved through two fundamental complementary
rights: the right to privacy, and the right to self-development. The right to privacy
dictates that the autonomy of the abstract individual is to be respected by the
various communal involvements of the individual. Privacy generates a host of
protective rights. The right to self-development dictates that the abstract
individual be allowed autonomously to pursue whatever mode of self-realization
the individual should choose. Self-development generates a host of promotive
rights. The complementary rights of privacy/self-development programmatically
inform all communal involvements of the abstract autonomous individual:
political, economic, legal, religious, and even philosophical.
Id.
54. See R.C. Pandeya, Human Rights: An Indian Perspective, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 267, 267.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 268 ("In other words, rights are earned and efforts made in acquiring them
confer certain privileges upon persons who take the trouble to exert themselves."). Status was
10
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the notion of human rights that inhere in a person merely by virtue of being
human, Hindu rights are acquired as the result of right action--dharma.
Hindu rights are accorded through one's conformity to dharma-to the law
of right action. Those who act rightly acquire the rights appropriate to their
manner of life; those who fail to act rightly do not acquire such rights."
Hindu rights are thus acquired not from one's intrinsic nature as a human,
but from one's extrinsic action as a human. Hindu rights are attendant not to
being human, but to the mode of being human-to one's dharma. Under the
ethical conceptuality of dharma, intrinsic human rights make no moral
sense.
5 8
The Western notion of human rights as intrinsic to the being of human
being therefore violates the conceptual grammar of dharma, which dictates
rather that human rights are accorded on the basis of right action. Right
action is a function of one's duty to act in accordance with dharma, a duty
that encompasses all behavior toward self, family, society, humanity, and
divinity. Hindu rights thus derive from duty.59 The fulfillment of one's duty
to act in accordance with dharma generates rights appropriate to the status
acquired by having acted rightly. Contrary to the Western logic of
relationship between rights and duties, duties are primary, rights
secondary.' Hindu rights are acquired only in relation to the fulfillment of a
most poignantly a function in classical India of inherited social status within the Hindu caste
system. This caste system was not constitutive of Hindu ethics, however, but rather a
reflection of it. For the Hindu, status was and remains a function of the value attendant to
one's existence-a value that derives from the acts or things achieved within one's life. Life,
of course, has a dramatically expanded sense in Hindu thought by virtue of the doctrine of re-
incarnation of the soul, or subtle body, as informed by the notion of karma. "The [subtle
body] endures the death of the gross (physical) body. The quality of actions performed in the
present life conditions the future life; the conditions of the present life are the result of past
actions. Thus one's [personal] endowment and social status are the consequence of past
deeds." Seshagiri Rao, supra note 12, at 1186. Status therefore derives ultimately from the
character of one's actions through the force of their karma, and the extent to which they
accord with dharma. Rights are entirely a function of such status. "What is one's right is
what is one's due, whether because of who one is by birth or because of what one has
accomplished." Carman, supra note 32, at 121.
57. See Pandeya, supra note 54, at 268 ("If rights are unearned, i.e. acquired without
effort, they become gratuitous. In the absence of voluntary human efforts these rights become
amoral and hence beyond considerations of good-bad and right-wrong. Thus so-called natural
rights become no-rights.").
58. See id. at 270 ("If you tell an Indian, who is alive to the Indian tradition, that he has
certain rights by virtue of his being a man he would laugh at you.").
59. See Yougindra Khushalani, Human Rights in Asia and Africa, in THIRD WORLD
ATTITUDEs TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 321, 324 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart
Sathirathai eds., 1987) ("In Hindu civilization human rights exist in relation to human
obligations.").
60. See Pandeya, supra note 54, at 271 ("In the Indian intellectual tradition, rights flow
from duties, whereas the [Western intellectual tradition] presumes that human rights being
basic, duties are determined by these rights."). For example, the right to work presumes the
obligation to work dutifully within prescribed restraints as dictated by society. The right to
work is forfeited when this prescribed duty is disobeyed. See id. at 274.
11
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duty to act rightly.6'
Underlying this variant logic of relationship between rights and duties
in Hindu ethics, moreover, resides a more profound difference from
Western ethical sensibility in the governing religious purpose of Hindu
moral obligation. Hindu moral duty to act rightly in accordance with
dharma is a religious obligation. The ultimate purpose of this religious
obligation is self-knowledge.' Hindu self-knowledge is the profound
awareness of the identity between one's human being and being itself,
whereby one may attain release from the otherwise ineluctable reincarnation
into continued existence.63 Although this salvific enlightenment (moksha)
may be achieved in a variety of different ways,' it is essentially a mode of
existential self-renunciation whereby one detaches oneself from any
personal interest in life:
But when a man has found delight and satisfaction and peace in the
Atman, then he is no longer obliged to perform any kind of action. He has
nothing to gain in this world by action, and nothing to lose by refraining
from action. He is independent of everybody and everything. Do your
duty always; but without attachment. This is how a man reaches the
ultimate Truth; by working without anxiety about results.6'
For the Hindu, the fulfillment of religious obligation is practiced without
regard to its social benefits. Indeed, Hindu religious obligation cannot be
fulfilled if practiced with any other than proper religious motives. Hence,
the fulfillment of one's religious duty whereby one inherits the social status
to which certain rights attend is motivated not by any interest in such rights.
Rather, such religious duty may only be fulfilled if one is detached from any
interest in the rights consequently acquired.' Although such rights devolve
from the status appropriate to the level of one's spiritual advancement, they
may not constitute the end to which one's spiritual efforts are directed as a
means. Spiritual advancement is measured, rather, by the extent to which
61. Consequently, there exists no semantic correlate for a human right per se in India.
See id. at 273.
62. See id. at 275 ("To know oneself is the supreme duty of man.").
63. "The sage who by faith, devotion, and meditation has realized the Self, and become
one with Brahman, is released from the wheel of change and escapes from rebirth, sorrow,
and death." Upanishads Kaivalya.
64. Although Hinduism is comprised of a plethora of sects, each advocating its own
particular dharma, classical Hinduism recognizes three basic ways of enlightened salvation:
Karma Marga (Way of Works: ritualistic in character); Jnana Yoga (Way of Knowledge:
intellectual in character, devolving primarily from the Upanishads); Bhakti Marga (Way of
Devotion: religiously devotional in character, quintessentially represented by the Bhagavad
Gita). See JOHN B. Noss, MAN'S RELIGIONS 186-95 (1974).
65. Bhagavad Gita bk. III (Karma Yoga).
66. See Pandeya, supra note 54, at 276 ("[Tlhe duty of man... consist[s] in moving
closer at every step to the spiritual goal and accordingly at every state of his progress towards
the cherished goal his rights would be determined with reference to his state of progress.").
12
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one remains detached from such personal interests. 7
The governing motive for Hindu religious obligation is thus not self-
interested, but selflessness. The Hindu is ultimately obliged religiously to
renounce personal interest in the self. The only motive properly permitted
the Hindu is that through one's own spiritual efforts others are led to do the
same. 8 Religious obligation for the Hindu is thus finally directed toward the
spiritual benefit of others. The Hindu ethic of dharma is accordingly
governed by the fulfillment of religious obligation, one's own as well as that
of others. The rights attendant to the performance of right action are entirely
consequential, and ultimately inconsequential, to the religious status
attained thereby.
Life in the world and life in the spirit are not incompatible. Work, or
action, is not contrary to knowledge of God, but indeed, if performed
without attachment, is a means to it. On the other hand, renunciation is
renunciation of the ego, of selfishness-not of life. The end, both of work
and of renunciation, is to know the Self within and Brahman without, and
to realize their identity. The Self is Brahman, and Brahman is all. 69
The driving principle of Hindu rights is ultimately rooted in this
distinctively non-self-interested religious motivation toward self-
renunciation."
67. "The ignorant work for the fruit of their action: The wise must work also [but]
without desire pointing man's feet to the path of his duty." Bhagavad Gita bk. III (Karma
Yoga).
68. See id. ("Your motive in working should be to set others, by your example, on the
path of duty.").
69. Upanishads Isha.
70. The religious motivation underlying Hindu rights, however, is not readily apparent
in much of contemporary Indian political discourse. Following its liberation from British rule
in 1948, India adopted its Constitution as a sovereign democratic republic in 1949. See
Seshagiri Rao, supra note 12, at 1189. This Constitution recognizes a variety of "fundamental
rights" for all Indian citizens, guaranteeing social, economic, and political equality. See id;
see also Carman, supra note 32. It therefore challenged the traditional Hindu social
stratification of varnadharma--caste system-which had privileged certain classes of people
over others in India since its antiquity. See id. at 118. The Indian Constitution was crafted,
however, with an expressly secular agenda of establishing political independence for the
nation of India and social/economic prosperity for her citizenry. The Constitution was not
written in terms of the conceptual grammar that has classically governed Hindu ethics
throughout its history. "[T]he constitution does not recognize the fundamental dharma
affirmed by the Hindu tradition and sets no spiritual obligation for the state itself or for the
people." Id. at 120. "Because it was written for a secular state, however, the Indian
Constitution does not address the spiritual, metaphysical, and ultimate concerns of the
individual. Nor does it seek to achieve the goal of total fulfillment of the person in the spirit
of dharma and in the atmosphere of non-violence." Seshagiri Rao, supra note 12, at 1189.
Based on nothing other than secular legislative concerns, the Indian Constitution makes "no
explicit appeal to that which is right (ius) beyond the letter of the enacted law (lex)." Carman,
supra note 32, at 120. The increasing concern of many Indian legal scholars is that the
Constitution-and the Western ethical conceptuality it represents-consequently exerts no
moral authority beyond mere legislative fiat, which perhaps accounts for the excessive
number of amendments that have been made to it. See id.; see also Pandeya, supra note 54, at
13
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The respective roots of Hindu rights and Western rights thus diverge
quite radically. Hindu rights are attendant to right action by virtue of
distinctly religious duties toward self-renunciation and the spiritual benefit
of others; Western rights are attendant to being human by virtue of
distinctly secular motives toward self-realization and the autonomy of the
individual. The individualism inherent in Western human rights, moreover,
is not a mere aspect of human rights conceptuality that may be readily
severed from its own deeper roots. On the contrary, the individualism of
Western human rights devolves from its own religious heritage. Properly to
understand the truly fundamental difference between Hindu and Western
rights requires articulation of the Judeo-Christian grammar of Western
human rights language.
IV. JUDEO-CHRISTIAN HERITAGE OF WESTERN RIGHTS
The primordially controlling religious concept for the Jewish
understanding of human being is its creation in the image of God: "So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male
and female he created them."'" By virtue of reflecting the divine image,
absolute worth is accorded to human being.7" Created in this image of God,
the worth of every individual person ultimately mirrors the value of human
being itself. 3 Judaism consequently ascribes the absolute value of humanity
270-71 (contending that the proclamation of human rights vis-A-vis the ethical conceptuality
of the Universal Declaration-and the Indian Constitution-is entirely antithetical to the
morality of classical Hindu thought, and thus exerts no real moral authority); Seshagari Rao,
supra note 12, at 1189 (arguing that the jurisprudence attendant to the ethical conceptuality
of the Indian Constitution remains foreign to Hinduism and thus exercises a merely external
legal authority-i.e., not an intrinsic moral authority). This concern devolves from the
ethical, if not metaphysical dissonance between Western rights talk and Hindu rights under
the doctrine of dharma.
71. Genesis 1:27.
72. "For at the core of the biblical system is the perception that the person is of absolute
and inviolate worth: created in the divine image." Michael Fishbane, The Image of the
Human and the Rights of the Individual in Jewish Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 31, at 17, 18. Fishbane notes that the biblical attribution of
absolute worth to human being distinguished early Judaism from other Near Eastern
religions. Among the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Hittites, human life could be measured
economically in terms of the value of property or possessions: "[L]ife and property are
commensurable values, used interchangeably in the legal system, there being presupposed an
exchange rate between persons and things." Id. The Bible allows no such economic valuation
of human being, and therefore permits no legal substitution of property for human life:
"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his
own image." Genesis 9:6.
73. See Fishbane, supra note 72, at 19 ("All humanity is bound up in the life of each
person."). Jewish commentary upon the Bible accordingly construed each person as a
microcosm of the human race:
It was for this reason Adam was created alone: to teach you that anyone who
destroys a single life, it is to be accounted to him by Scripture as if he has
destroyed the whole world, and whoever preserves a single life, it is accounted to
14
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to every person. The Jewish understanding of human rights is entirely a
function of this extraordinary value divinely granted to humanity." '
From this Jewish heritage, Western rights acquire their absolute
character as attendant to the human being of every individual. Within
Judaism, however, the absolute character of human rights is not intrinsic to
the being of human being, but is divinely granted. Such divine regard may
be withheld or withdrawn depending upon fulfillment of God's will through
obedience to the revealed Law of God (Torah)." Although absolute, Jewish
human rights are not universal.76
Within its Christian heritage, however, divine regard for human being
was perfected by the Son of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Through
Christ, humanity is freed from sin, redeemed before God, and exists in a
state of grace."' Rectification between God and humankind is thus entirely
God's doing. Through Christ, therefore, humankind is freed from the logic
(or word) of Law, and lives in the logic (or word) of Spirit whereby divine
Grace may be enjoyed fully and eternally: "For the wages of sin is death,
but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord."7 In essence,
the Law of God is fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, which fulfillment is
accorded by the Grace of God to all of humankind. Divine regard is
therefore realized not through obedience (to the Law), but through faith (in
Christ): "If you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you
him by Scripture as if he had preserved a whole world.
M. Sanhedrin 4.5 (Mishnah from the second to third century C.E.), quoted in Fishbane, supra
note 72, at 19.
74. See Fishbane, supra note 72, at 17:
The fundamental presupposition of the rights of the person in Judaism is a belief
in the absolute and uncompromisable worth of human life. This belief is grounded
in the unique value of the individual in the divine scheme of creation and is
variously articulated in both biblical literature and rabbinic tradition.
Id.
75. Judaism has generally confined its absolute regard for human life to those of the
Jewish faith who, moreover, properly fulfill their religious duties as such. See id. at 25.
76. Not only has Jewish regard for the absolute value of human life been historically
confined to those of the Jewish faith who fulfill their religious duties as such, but certain
categories of persons were not historically accorded full human status to begin with (e.g.,
idiots, minors, women, androgenes, etc.). See id. at 26.
77. As the incarnation of divinity in humanity, the person of Jesus Christ rectified the
relationship between God and humankind-a rectification achieved not by human fulfillment
of the Law, but by the Grace of God.
For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin
and death. For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do:
sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin
in the flesh, in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us,
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will know the truth, and the truth will make you free."79 Christian freedom
from Jewish Law is therefore "granted by God and received in faith."80 The
Christian is free from the burden of the Law by virtue of living in Grace.
"For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus
Christ."'" This is the Christian faith.
82
The Christian understanding of human rights is entirely a function of
the extraordinary value divinely granted to human being through the person
of Jesus Christ. This value is not only absolute; it is fait accompli. Through
Christ, all persons exist in the state of Grace by virtue of being human.
79. John 8:31-32. The freedom referred to here is freedom from the burden of having to
fulfill the divine will through obedience to God's law: "For freedom Christ has set us free;
stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery." Galations 5:1.
80. Trutz Rendtorff, Christian Concepts of the Responsible Self in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 31, at 33, 39.
81. John 1:17.
82. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, God and Truth: A Conceptual Analysis of
Religious Commitment; Subversion of the S/subject (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Yale University) (on file with author) (discussing the metaphysics, philosophical and
theological, of the Christian faith). A leading theologian of the twentieth century properly
construes the Christian faith accordingly:
To believe means to believe in Jesus Christ. But this means to keep wholly and
utterly to the fact that our temporal existence receives and has and again receives
its truth, not from itself, but exclusively from its relationship to what Jesus Christ
is and does as our Advocate and Mediator in God himself.... [I]n faith we
abandon whatever we might otherwise regard as our standing, namely, our
standing upon ourselves.., for the real standing in which we no longer stand on
ourselves ... but.., on the ground of the truth of God and therefore on the
ground of the reconciliation which has taken place in Jesus Christ and is
confirmed by him to all eternity.
II KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Pt.1 159 (T.H.L. Parker et al.
trans., G.W. Bromiley & T.F. Torrance eds., 1957). The truth of Jesus Christ is the truth of
the reconciliation between the divine and the human. For the Christian faith, Jesus Christ
reveals this truth by virtue of embodying this reconciliation. The truth that we humans are
constitutionally unable to realize is realized in the constitution of Jesus Christ. See Ritter,
supra at 158. "Jesus Christ is the atonement. But that means that He is the maintaining and
accomplishing and fulfilling of the divine covenant as executed by God Himself." IV KARL
BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Pt.4 34-35 (G.W. Bromiley trans., G.W.
Bromiley & T.F. Torrance eds., 1956). The person of Jesus Christ thus renders/reveals full
accord between divinity and humanity, and accordingly between God and all persons.
Although this accord is realized by Christ alone, it is revealed to humanity, the only proper
response to which is faith: "Believers 'are' the elect.., so far as they bear witness to the
truth, that is, to the elect man, Jesus Christ, and manifest and reproduce and reflect the life of
this one Elect." II KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Pt.2 347 (G.W.
Bromiley et al. trans., G.W. Bromiley & T.F. Torrance eds., 1957). Constitutionally unable to
realize the truth of the divine-human accord itself, truth is realized for humanity by Jesus
Christ. Humanity thus receives truth vicariously. Only through faith in its revelation may this
truth be acknowledged and received. "[T]he truth of man's being.., can consist in nothing
other than in man's response with a corresponding faithfulness to the way and work of God
[in Jesus Christ], to God's faithfulness." II KARL BARTH, Pt. 1, supra, at 207. Reconciliation
between divinity and humanity is therefore accomplished by God, through the person of
Jesus Christ, but for the salvific benefit of all human kind.
16
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Christ rectified divine regard for human being. All humans participate in
this rectification. Divine regard for the individual is thus utterly independent
of anything the individual is or does. Grace is prevenient; achieved not by
human, but by divine effort in the person of Christ. The absolute value of a
person therefore pre-exists any social differentia and is consequently
universal. All persons are accordingly equal by virtue of no-thing-not by
virtue of anything a person is or does. Pre-established through Christ, divine
regard for humanity is absolute, universal, and egalitarian.
Human rights language within the Christian religious tradition
addresses itself to this divine regard, and is accordingly dictated by the
Word of God revealed through Jesus Christ. Universal egalitarian regard for
the absolute value of the individual devolves from the radical freedom from
the Law provided by Grace in the person of Jesus Christ.83 The Christian
community of faith proclaims this freedom:
But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law,
although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, the righteousness of
God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no
distinction; since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they
are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in
Jesus Christ, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be
received by faith."
Christian rights language is thus governed by the grammar of grace as
voiced within the community of faith through its express belief in the
Christ. The Christian community of faith is itself the communal incarnation
of Christ as proclaiming redemption through Christ.8"
As the communal incarnation of Christ, Christian ethics is accordingly
governed by the single moral dictate of Christ as the Word of God: "I give
you a new commandment: love one another; just as I have loved you, you
must also love one another." 6 The Law-whereby the human is reconciled
with the divine-becomes through Christ the singular commandment to be
toward all others as Christ was: to love-unconditionally, without regard to
anything a person is or does.87 Christian love is granted through divine
83. See Rendtorff, supra note 80, at 43 (discussing the Christian content to modem
"human rights": "Secularization as rationalization means to express the Christian concept of
freedom and responsibility in nontheological language, thus giving human freedom a
universal form.").
84. Romans 3:21-25.
85. "For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them."
Matthew 18:20.
86. John 13:34.
87. See Matthew 22: 35-40:
And one of ... [the Pharisees], a lawyer, asked... [Jesus] a question, to test him
[on Jewish Law]. "Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the law?" And
he said to him, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all
your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a
17
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grace-a function not of human achievement; Christian love is received in
gratitudeas profoundly undeserved.
The Judeo-Christian religious heritage of human rights thus dictates an
ethics of unconditional love for all persons. Judeo-Christian regard for
persons is requisitely absolute, universal, and egalitarian: absolute by virtue
of humanity's creation in the Image of God according divine worth to
human kind; universal by virtue of the reconciliation between God and
humanity realized by the person of Jesus Christ-vicariously fulfilling the
Law for all persons; and egalitarian by virtue of its attribution to all
individuals through grace-esteeming all individuals equally on the basis of
nothing a person otherwise is or does. Absolute, universal, and egalitarian,
Judeo-Christian regard for others-for all others-is therefore a function of
nothing-of no social differentia whatsoever. At its root, the Judeo-
Christian regard for persons is not a human regard at all, but is a function
rather of the divine regard for human kind. In the Judeo-Christian heritage,
this divine regard for humanity is graciously absolute, universal, and
egalitarian.
The Judeo-Christian tradition therefore accords absolute, universal, and
egalitarian value to all individuals-simply and only by virtue of their being
human. The Judeo-Christian tradition accordingly provides the governing
religious ethic whereby Western rights are uniquely construed to inhere
absolutely, universally, and equally in all persons on the basis of the
inherent dignity of every individual human being simply by virtue of being
human, and not by virtue of any other defining social characteristic
whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
The differences between Indic and Western rights run as deep as the
theological differences between Hinduism and Judeo-Christianity. Hindu
rights are attendant to right action by virtue of a distinctly religious duty
toward self-renunciation and the spiritual benefit of others; Judeo-Christian
rights are attendant to being human by virtue of a distinctly religious
attribution of absolute, universal, and egalitarian worth to all individuals.
Contrary, then, to the claims of Subedi, the roots of Hindu and Western
rights diverge quite profoundly. The absolute, universal, and egalitarian
character of Western rights of the individual is simply not consonant with
the character of Hindu rights acquired through dharmic action.
Subedi's analysis of human rights thus commits a rather ironic
second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two
commandments depend all the law and the prophets."
Id. When asked to clarify who one's neighbor is, Jesus responds with the Good Samaritan
parable, making it clear that neighbor encompasses all others, no matter how detestable. See
Luke 10:29-37.
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oversight. He defends the universality of human rights by contending that
Western scholars neglect to inquire into the ancient religiosity of non-
Western cultures, and thus fail to see the deep roots of human rights
principles in these other cultures:
Those who have claimed that the notion of human rights is the product of
Western Christian civilization have sought to project the selective
nineteenth-century values (values of the peak period of colonial
domination) backwards into the past. They have not taken into full
account the developments that took place prior to the colonization
period.88
Oddly enough, Subedi commits the very same error by not taking into full
account the development of Western human rights conceptuality that took
place well prior to the nineteenth century. By assuming that Western human
rights devolved from the European Enlightenment, Subedi himself fails to
recognize their own ancient religious roots. He thus too readily dismisses
nineteenth-century values as non-intrinsic to human rights principles, which
allows him to sever these values from what he therefore holds forth as the
ancient roots of human rights in other cultures. Western human rights,
however, devolve from own an equally ancient Judeo-Christian heritage,
and the nineteenth-century values attendant to Western human rights are
themselves a function of that very same heritage. Although Subedi's
contention that the "excessive individualism" of modem Western culture
may readily be excised from the deeper roots of human rights principles
ignores the religious roots of Western rights language, it does provide an
interesting point of departure for reflection upon whether the Western
language of human rights is fully consonant with its own Judeo-Christian
heritage.
Western rights are attendant to being human by virtue of distinctly
secular motives toward self-realization and the autonomy of the individual.
Western talk of human rights speaks secularly about the intrinsic value of
each human being-an intrinsic value equally common to each and every
individual simply by virtue of being human. The grammar of Western rights
language thus truncates the worth of human being into the essence of human
being, having collapsed this essence into the abstract autonomy of the
individual. Absent its religious heritage, however, Western rights language
voices a secular misconstrual of the worth of the individual. The Judeo-
Christian tradition from which Western rights talk historically devolves
construes the absolute worth of the individual as a function of divine regard.
The truncation of this divine regard into the essence of human being
consequently transforms an ethics driven by unconditional love of others
into an ethics driven by unconditional self-interest. When worth is granted,
it is received graciously; when owned, it is demanded indignantly. In its
88. Subedi, supra note 1, at 45.
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secular enthusiasm to abstract the human worth of the individual from all
possible differentia, particularly religious, Western rights language
collapsed a uniquely Judeo-Christian understanding of the absolute worth of
all persons into the being of the individual. Judeo-Christian rights
grammatically structured in terms of divine regard consequently became
Western rights grammatically structured in terms of human self-regard.
Subedi's reflections upon the religious roots of human rights language
should therefore inspire Western scholars and jurists to rethink the religious
heritage of our own notion of human rights. The secularism of Western
jurisprudence may have nobly intended to construe human rights as
absolute, universal, and egalitarian-and therefore not contingent upon any
particular social differentia, particularly religious-but consequently
compromised the governing religious ethic that provides for their absolute,
universal, and egalitarian character.
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